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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35, Heritage Imports 
("Heritage"), respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
its Memorandum Decision dated March 11, 1999. Heritage 
certifies this request is made in good faith and not for delay. 
INTRODUCTION 
William Anthony Kraatz ("Kraatz") presented extrinsic 
evidence on numerous occasions to the trial court in aid of his 
interpretations of the parties1 Employment Agreement 
("Agreement"). He repeatedly failed to object to similar 
evidence introduced at trial by Heritage. Kraatz never claimed 
at trial the Agreement was unambiguous, and even admitted on 
appeal it was ambiguous. 
The case law is clear. In order to preserve this 
issue for appeal, Kraatz must have refrained from introducing 
extrinsic evidence and must have preserved the record by 
objecting to its introduction by Heritage. Having failed to do 
so, he cannot argue for the first time on appeal extrinsic 
evidence was improper. 
The first time this issue was raised was at oral 
argument when Judge Bench asked counsel for Heritage where the 
Agreement was ambiguous. (Recording of oral argument.) This 
Court then issued its Memorandum Decision ("Decision"), ruling 
on page 2 "the trial court did not need to hear extrinsic 
evidence." In so doing, this Court for the first time on appeal 
and sua sponte, decided as outcome determinative an issue never 
1 
raised by either party, ever presented to the trial court, and 
never briefed or fully argued on appeal. 
Case law provides such issues should not be raised by 
an appellate court sua sponte. Alleged errors must be raised at 
trial to allow correction during the course of proceedings. 
Otherwise, judicial resources are wasted. 
Further, due to the complexities of this case, it is 
submitted further consideration should be given to Heritage's 
claim the Agreement is ambiguous, especially as to the duties 
and responsibilities of the General Manager. Finally, assuming 
arguendo, parol evidence may be challenged for the first time on 
appeal and assuming the Agreement is then determined 
unambiguous, Kraatz breached it by refusing "to devote his full 
and exclusive time to perform" his services and by not 
fulfilling his "responsibility to provide management training." 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
This Court found error "in considering extrinsic 
evidence because the language of the contract is unambiguous." 
(Decision, p.2.) However, when the issues were framed for 
trial, there was no claim in the Joint Pretrial Order that the 
What wasn't asked was "how" or "why" the lower court made its 
determination of ambiguity. The answer is ambiguity was never 
doubted. Both parties tried the case on that basis. For this 
reason, counsel for Heritage failed to get the "drift" of this 
Court's questioning and apologizes for not explaining the 
procedural history at oral argument. 
2
 In the proceedings below, there were 27 depositions, hundreds 
of exhibits, and four days of trial, for which Kraatz' counsel 
asserted pretrial attorney fees exceeding $200,000. (Joint 
Pretrial Order, p. 3.) Much of the time and resources expended 
were due to Kraatz' pursuit of parol evidence. 
2 
Agreement was unambiguous. (See Joint Pretrial Order.) Kraatz 
later admitted to this Court in his reply brief there is 
ambiguity.3 More importantly, not only did Kraatz fail to 
object to the introduction and consideration of extrinsic 
evidence, he introduced much of the extrinsic evidence himself.^ 
The following are examples of relevant extrinsic 
evidence introduced by Kraatz or by Heritage without his 
objection. 
While Kraatz tries to distance himself from any 
responsibility or accountability for the profitability of the 
dealership, it is clear that, as found by Judge Frederick, the 
"thrust of the negotiations was that the dealership must return 
to profitability". (R. 2467.) This door was opened by Kraatz1 
counsel. 
Q: [by Mr. Zundel] Okay. What did Bry tell 
you about his dealership? 
A: [by Mr. Kraatz] That it was not doing as 
well as he had wanted it to, that Denny 
Boyle, who had been with Bry for a number of 
years, had left him, I believe, a year 
"While the Agreement might be ambiguous about the scope of 
Kraatz' specific duties, it is unambiguous that Kraatz promised 
to contribute only his 'best professional skill' in performing 
them, he did not guarantee success." Kraatz1 Reply Brief p. 4.) 
There are also numerous other examples of extrinsic evidence 
relating to the duties of the General Manager set forth in the 
trial court's Findings of Fact ("FF") and Conclusions of Law 
("CL"). See, e.g., during contract negotiations, Kraatz was 
allowed access to all financial records (FF B.4.; R. 2015); 
Kraatz' expert admitted the Honda dealership was a "license to 
steal," (FF. B.8.; R. 2339); Larry H. Miller testified that one 
of a general manager's responsibilities is to manage cash 
flow,(FF D.5.) and that the dealership was not undercapitalized 
and should have made a profit,(FF E.2-4 & 22; R. 2078, 2081); 
and B. Wilkinson told one of his bankers "He had given [Kraatz] 
complete control and responsibility for running the dealership." 
(FF D.8; R. 2059.) 
3 
before, that Helen Green had been the 
general manager more recently, and that he 
didn't like the direction it was going. (Tr. 
1751.) 
Without objection, Kraatz testified about further 
meetings he had with Bry Wilkinson before signing the Agreement. 
Kraatz represented, inter alia, the dealership "should be making 
a million dollars a year." (Tr. 1851-52.) 
Extrinsic evidence came from Kraatz when he testified 
about his qualifications, management experience and skills, and 
association with other dealers and trade groups. (R. 1748-49.) 
When Judge Frederick asked about relevance, Kraatz' counsel 
responded: "This will have relevance, your Honor, to show Mr. 
Kraatz' management style and the relevance of some statistics 
we'll put in later on and his efficiency and experience." (R. 
1748-1750.) 
After the Agreement was signed (and again without 
objection), Bry Wilkinson testified to accountability meetings 
every 3 0 days with Kraatz concerning profitability. 
Q. [by Mr. Winder] Did you discuss profitability at 
these meetings? 
A. [by B. Wilkinson] Oh, yes. 
Q. Did you always discuss it? 
A. Well, that was pretty important to him and to me. 
I'd say we discussed it most every time, along 
with other things. 
. . . 
Q. What did you say and what did he say about 
profitability? 
A. Well, I mentioned that I had hoped our gross per 
car would have been better and our total gross 
had been better and that we'd have done a little 
better, and he said, "Well, you know, it takes a 
little while to get started. Put some people in 
4 
place and it's going to come, Bry, it's going to 
come." (R. 2027-2030.)5 
Instead of objecting to the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence, Kraatz took the issue head-on. Kraatz' expert 
testified about whether profitability had in fact declined under 
his tenure. (See generally, R. 2425-30.) Kraatz took the 
approach the dealership was not as profitable as it should have 
been because he did not have enough control, or that 
profitability was improving. (See, e.g.. Kraatz' counsel 
closing arguments, R. 2446, 2447 & 2449-50.) 
Kraatz claimed under the Agreement he had a five-year 
no-cut contract.6 
Q. [by Mr. Zundel] What did he [B. Wilkinson] 
say to the employees about you? 
A. [by Mr. Kraatz] Basically . . . just 
introduced me as the new general manager, 
told the employees that I had a five-year 
no-cut contract, that I was going to be the 
general manager of the dealership and they 
would be responsible to me for their 
performance. 
Q. Did he ever use the term no-cut contract 
with anyone else in your presence in 
describing your relationship with Heritage? 
A. I believe he did. He had taken me up to the 
executive offices of Key Bank and introduced 
me to Mr. David Bronson and Richard Nelson 
and George Redd who I'd met on a previous 
occasion, I think. 
. . . 
Q. Did he use the term no-cut in that 
conversation? 
A. That is my recollection, yes.(R. 1832-1833.) 
Lack of profitability was the first reason given by Bry 
Wilkinson for terminating Kraatz. (FP E.21.a; R. 2033.) 
Bry Wilkinson denied such statements (R. 2006 & 2039), as did 
Pat Nichols, an employee of the dealership. (R. 2408.) 
5 
Kraatz also failed to object to the introduction 
by Heritage of an initial contract draft, showing the 
parties1 intent concerning causes for termination, in 
opposition to Kraatz1 "no-cut" assertion.7 (R. 1848-49.) 
At trial, Kraatz asserted he was entitled to 
retirement benefits and Christmas bonuses outlined in an 
employee handbook. (Ex. 135, introduced by Kraatz.) Although he 
claimed entitlement to benefits provided in the handbook, he 
denied he was subject to its limitations, such as the right of 
the dealership to discharge an employee for various kinds of 
inappropriate conduct.8 (See FF F.9.d.) The handbook also made 
profitability "the ultimate measure" of efficiency, and 
insubordination "cause for discharge." (Id. F.9.f.) 
Finally, Kraatz admitted his duties included the care 
and keeping of dealership assets, financial forecasting and 
producing income for the dealership (or at least supervising the 
individuals who generate sales).9 (R. 1851; FF D.1.-4.) 
The initial draft of the contract prepared by Kraatz(FF. B.9; 
R. 1849; Ex. 589, see Addendum "B" to Heritage's Brief) was 
closer to a "no-cut" contract since it did not provide for 
termination for "C. Refusal by Employee to fulfill his 
employment responsibilities described in Article I of this 
Agreement." 
8
 B. Wilkinson's reasons for termination related to such 
improper conduct. (FF E.21; Tr. 1694; see also FF E.17.) 
9
 This Court, on page 3 of the Decision, quoted this testimony 
in disagreement with the trial court's Findings Kraatz bore 
responsibility for profitability. Heritage respectfully submits 
this testimony coupled with all the other extrinsic evidence 
regarding profitability demonstrates the trial court's Findings 
are not clearly erroneous. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
At trial, Kraatz failed to object to the admission of 
extrinsic evidence. A party must make a specific objection to 
the admission of evidence and allow the trial judge the 
opportunity to correct the alleged error in order to preserve 
the issue for appeal- Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah County v. Brown. 
672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Not only did Kraatz not object below,10 
but nowhere in his briefs did he claim the trial court 
erroneously considered extrinsic evidence, and thus, the issue 
cannot now be considered on appeal. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores. 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Even though the determination of ambiguity is one of 
law, that determination must yield to the well-settled rule that 
where a party introduces or fails to object to extrinsic 
evidence at trial, he cannot raise the issue to his benefit for 
the first time on appeal. In Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett. 735 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court considered a 
similar case where parol evidence was admitted by both parties 
without objection at trial, with the losing party then objecting 
Not until the third day of trial did Kraatz1 counsel object. 
His objection then was to relevancy, not the consideration of 
extrinsic evidence. Only this one objection was made and it was 
never renewed. (Tr. 2036). 
7 
for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court held 
"Because defendants did not object to the extrinsic evidence at 
the trial level, they cannot claim on appeal that the document 
is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to interpretation 
with extrinsic evidence." Id. at 1309. 
Similarly, in Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 656-67 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court held an appellant: 
cannot argue the court was limited to the four 
corners of the document after his failure to 
object to the introduction of, and his ability to 
offer, parol evidence at trial. The trial court 
found the terms of the option agreement definite 
enough to be enforceable and allowed in extrinsic 
evidence to effectuate the terms of the agreement 
in accordance with the parties' intent. Id. 
Additionally, in In re: Justheim. 824 P.2d 432 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), this court held the failure to object to parol evidence 
constitutes a waiver. This Court ruled "[a] party [is] not 
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and 
appellate review of issue." Id., 435 n.4. 
It is also improper under the case law for an 
appellate court to raise such an issue for the first time sua 
sponte. "[I]n the absence of special circumstances, an 
appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the 
trial court." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). Moreover, "[i]n general, if a 
defendant has not raised an issue on appeal, we may not consider 
the issue sua sponte." State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Even though ambiguity is a question of law, it may not 
override the well-settled principle that an appellate court only 
8 
addresses issues raised to the trial court. State v. South, 885 
P.2d 795, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(consistent with notions of 
fairness, parties are generally entitled to notice of the issues 
being appealed before briefing.) 
In Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow an appellant to 
object to the extrinsic evidence for the first time on appeal, 
holding: 
At first blush, it may appear that the trial 
court erred in considering the foregoing 
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the 
parties without first concluding, as a matter of 
law, that the agreement was ambiguous. However, 
notwithstanding the lack of a specific finding of 
ambiguity, it is implicit in the record before us 
that the trial court viewed the settlement 
agreement as ambiguous. In addition, it is 
apparent that the parties themselves accepted as 
a foregone conclusion the ambiguity of the 
settlement agreement. This is to be seen in that 
although Fitzgeralds objected to the sufficiency 
of the evidence recited in the findings of fact, 
they did not object in any manner to the failure 
of the trial court to conclude that the 
settlement agreement was ambiguous. Id. at 
360-61. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997), that "'[I]f a party 
through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then 
decline to save that party from the error1 . . . ." This 
holding includes claims under the plain error doctrine. 
11
 Finally, the plain error doctrine is not applicable where 
the trial court was led into the alleged error through Kraatz 
introduction of extrinsic evidence. "One who has thus taken his 
chances of advantage has not, when he finds the testimony 
prejudicial, the legal right to exclude it." In re Justheim, 
supra, 824 P.2d at 435 n.4. 
9 
Kraatz should not be allowed to lead the trial court 
into error and then claim the same error for his benefit on 
appeal. The trial court's Findings of Fact are supported by the 
record, including extrinsic evidence offered by both parties, 
and the Conclusions of Law are founded upon credible evidence 
and correct law. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS 
The Agreement is ambiguous as to the duties and 
responsibilities of the General Manager. As stated on page 1 of 
the Decision, "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" (Citations omitted.) Accordingly, parol 
evidence is admissible in order to ascertain the parties' intent 
concerning unexpressed issues. See Stanqer v. Sentinal Sec. 
Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983); Wade v. Stanal. 
869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, there are 
many contested issues where the Agreement is silent, especially 
• • • • 12 
in defining the General Manager's duties. 
Article I, f 1.2(a) of the Agreement employs Kraatz as 
the General Manager and defines his duties through a partial 
listing of examples: 
Provide day-to-day management over the 
operations of the Dealership, including 
managing the new and used car sales 
12
 The trial court found Kraatz' assertion of a no-cut contract 
was not supported by the evidence nor with a comparison of the 
draft agreement (Ex. 589) "[which] expands the reasons for 
termination under the Agreement." (CL B.10.) 
10 
departments, service department, parts 
department and financing and insurance 
departments. (Emphasis supplied).1 
"Include" means "to take in as a part, an element, or a member." 
American Heritage Dictionary, p. 913 (3d ed. 1992); see also. In 
re Hartman, 443 N.E.2d 516, 5176 (Ohio 1993), citing Webster's 
Third New Int'l Dictionary: 
In short, 'including1 implies that that which 
follows is a partial, not exhaustive, listing 
of all which is subsumed within the stated 
category. 'Including' is a word of expansion 
rather than one of limitation or 
restriction").14 
Based upon its interpretation as a matter of law, this 
Court concluded "The duties of a general manager, as specified 
in the contract, do not include making a profit." (Decision, 
p. 3.) Respectfully, how can that conclusion be reconciled with 
the remainder of paragraph 1.2(a), providing: 
Employee [Kraatz] shall have responsibility 
and authority over all aspects of the daily 
operations . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Isn't profit a "daily aspect" of any business. Doesn't the 
partial listing of services demonstrate clearly these are 
"missing terms" which need to be clarified through extrinsic 
evidence. 
13
 See also Paragraph 1.2(b) of the Agreement: "The duties and 
responsibilities of Employee [Kraatz] shall include, but not be 
limited to . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
14
 The Decision (p. 2) held "The ordinary meaning of contract 
terms is often best determined through standard, non-legal 
dictionaries." 
11 
The trial court specifically found "Plaintiff's 
responsibilities under the Agreement included the production of 
income at the Dealership." (FF D.l; see also FF D.13; CL B.6 
& E.l.) This Finding was based, not just on extrinsic 
evidence,15 but also the language of the Agreement itself, 
(CL.D.2.) The third Recital to the Agreement states: 
WHEREAS, Employee [Kraatz] has skills, 
personality traits and management skills, 
which are conducive to development and 
maintenance of such interpersonal relations, 
management of personnel, financing and sales 
and operating an automobile dealership, 
(Emphasis added.)16 
The trial court's Findings give prospective effect to 
the words "development and maintenance". If the parties agreed 
Kraatz had management skills "conducive to development and 
maintenance of" "financing and sales and operating an automobile 
dealership," such skills included making a profit.17 
15
 "The general manager is the glue that holds the Dealership 
together. Plaintiff breached the Employment Agreement by 
failing to supply the consideration intended by the parties in 
formulating the Agreement." (CL D.l) 
16
 From this language, this Court determined "the parties 
recognized that Kraatz already possessed all the necessary 
skills and traits to be a general manager," concluding there was 
no "need to hear extrinsic evidence." (Decision, p. 2.) The 
trial court, however, found these were the representations of 
Kraatz—not the agreement of the parties. 
(FF C.2.) 
17
 Words such as "development" and "maintenance" infer future 
action, not just a present representation. Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1961) defines "develop" at p. 226, as 
follows: "to evolve the possibilities of"; "to advance; 
further; to promote the growth of". "Maintain" is defined, at 
p. 507, as "to continue or preserve in or with; to carry on...to 
uphold and defend...support." 
12 
Finally, a trial court's decision should be affirmed 
on any proper basis, even if not expressly set forth below. 
See, e.g., State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). The 
testimony of B. Wilkinson after the execution of the Agreement 
concerning accountability meetings demonstrates the parties' 
subsequent intent that Kraatz was responsible for profitability. 
Either this was a subsequent oral modification to the 
18 • • • 
Agreement or the best evidence of their intent under that 
Agreement under the doctrine of practical construction. See, 
e.g., Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975). 
POINT III 
EVEN IF UNAMBIGUOUS, KRAATZ BREACHED THE AGREEMENT 
BY REFUSING "TO DEVOTE HIS FULL AND 
EXCLUSIVE TIME TO PERFORM 
HIS SERVICES" AND BY NOT FULFILLING 
HIS "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE 
MANAGEMENT TRAINING" 
Admittedly, the Agreement gives Kraatz "authority over 
all aspects of the daily operations." (Agreement, f 1.2(b).) 
Based upon this provision, this Court concluded: 
Nothing in the contract suggests that anyone 
other than Kraatz would have authority to set 
work schedules. Thus, Kraatz's refusal to work 
Saturdays is not cause for his termination. 
(Decision, p. 3.) 1 9 But the Agreement also expressly provides 
in paragraph 1.2(c), in relevant part: 
It is fundamental that an Agreement may subsequently be 
modified, even where there is an express provision to the 
contrary (See f 5.2 of the Agreement). Ted R. Brown & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988); Rapp 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 
1980). 
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(c) [Kraatz] shall contribute his best 
professional skill to perform the Services at all 
times for the business and benefit of the Company 
[Heritage]. Employee [Kraatz] agrees to devote 
his full and exclusive time to perform the 
Services . . . .(emphasis supplied.) 
In interpreting a contract, a more specific provision 
(relating to the time to be devoted to employment responsibili-
ties such as 5 1.2(c)), governs over a more general one (like 
f 1.2(b)). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
203(c)(1979). Kraatz was an employee of Heritage Honda, the 
majority shareholder was B. Wilkinson. (FF A.l.) B. Wilkinson, 
as the owner and dealer, instructed his son J. Wilkinson to 
prepare a work schedule to require Kraatz to work more evenings 
and Saturdays. (FF. E.21.d.) J. Wilkinson testified as 
follows: 
Q. [by Mr. Zundel] Okay. Now, you prepared a 
schedule for Mr. Kraatz to work which has been 
marked previously in this case as Exhibit No. 1. 
A. [by J. Wilkinson]. Yes. 
Q. And you prepared this document at your 
father's request; is that right? 
A. Correct. (Tr. 2 3 62; see also Tr. 2368.) 
Based upon this testimony, the trial court found: 
Plaintiff refused to work the schedule B. 
Wilkinson had ordered J. Wilkinson to prepare, 
despite the fact that the busiest day of the week 
in car sales is Saturday, and the busiest sales 
time of a day is from 4:00 p.m. until closing. 
(Emphasis added.) (FF. D.12.) 
1
 Nothing in the Agreement, however, expressly says Kraatz has 
authority to set his own work schedule or that he didn't answer 
to a higher authority i.e., the Dealer. At a minimum, isn't 
this then a "missing term" for which consideration may be given 
to extrinsic evidence? 
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The Agreement in paragraph 2.I.e. states Kraatz may be 
terminated for "refusal . . . to fulfill his employment 
responsibilities." This Court, on page 3 of the Decision, 
defines "refuse" as "to show or express a positive unwillingness 
to do or comply with." The question thus arises, to whom could 
Kraatz direct any refusal to if not B. Wilkinson? Could the 
Agreement reasonably contemplate Kraatz was to express his 
unwillingness to fulfill his management responsibilities to 
himself. Such an interpretation is absurd and disfavored in the 
law. See LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1988; Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food, 889 P.2d 445, 458 n.16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).20 
The Agreement in paragraph 1.2(b) also required Kraatz 
to "provide management training to persons selected by Company 
to enable said persons to become qualified dealers or managers 
acceptable to American Honda, Incorporated.11 This Court stated 
on page 4 of its Decision fl[a]lthough the record shows that J. 
Wilkinson may have been difficult to train, it does not reflect 
that Kraatz failed to train him during the contract term.11 
Heritage respectfully points out the following Findings of Fact 
made by Judge Frederick: 
Kraatz claimed the dealer (B. Wilkinson) had overall 
responsibility to hire and fire employees. (Tr. 1851) How then 
can it be doubted B. Wilkinson has the authority to set the work 
schedules for any employees. Further, interpretation that 
Kraatz is subject to direction by the business owner is 
consistent with a provision in the same Article that Kraatz be 
"consulted on all items of long range planning relating to the 
dealership.11 (Agreement f 1.2(a).) 
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5. The only attempt during his entire twenty-
seven month tenure that Plaintiff made to train 
either J. Wilkinson or Jeff Gorringe was to place 
J. Wilkinson in financing and insurance ("F & 
I"). At no time did Plaintiff ever attempt to 
place J. Wilkinson in the Parts Department, 
Service Department, or in Accounting. At no time 
did Plaintiff give instruction to J. Wilkinson on 
the hiring and firing of personnel, on management 
of assets, on employee interviews, or other 
aspects of general management. 
6. J. Wilkinson testified he received no 
training while in F&I. 
. . . 
16. The testimony of B. Wilkinson and J. 
Wilkinson is uncontroverted that Plaintiff failed 
to train J. Wilkinson to become a qualified 
dealer or manager acceptable to American Honda. 
(FF E.5, 6, & 16) 
Respectfully, this Court cannot disregard or overturn 
factual findings based on credible evidence. This Court may 
only overturn factual findings if they are clearly erroneous and 
not supported in the record after resolving all disputes in a 
light favorable to the trial court's determination. See State 
v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah 
1997). Moreover, in Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 
1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court ruled: 
if the contract is ambiguous and the trial court 
makes factual findings about the intent of the 
parties based on extrinsic evidence, our review is 
strictly limited. If those findings are supported 
by substantial, competent evidence in the record, 
they are not clearly erroneous under Utah R. Civ. 
P* 52(a) and we will not disturb them on appeal. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact outlined above are 
supported in the Record (Tr. 2380-81.) 
B. Wilkinson had semi-retired, leaving the day-to-day 
management of Heritage to Kraatz. (FF. B.5) The purpose of this 
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training was B. Wilkinson's plan to pass the business on to his 
family members. (Tr. 2041, 2467.) 
Although Kraatz made a conclusory claim he attempted 
to train the children, (see Tr. 1794.), he provided no 
supporting details. When faced with contradictory testimony, 
the trial court, as fact finder, may weigh conflicting 
testimony, assess credibility and demeanor, and believe one 
witness over another. See State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the trial court believed the 
testimony from J. Wilkinson over Kraatz' unsupported claim. 
(See R. 2466.) 
This Court's Decision (p. 4) also states the "Record 
contains no evidence suggesting that J. Wilkinson or Jeff 
Gorringe were unacceptable to American Honda, Incorporated." 
Since these individuals received no training, how could they 
have been submitted to American Honda. The law does not require 
a useless act. See Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 
1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied sub nom. 879 P.2d 266 
(1994) . 
This Court finally found "even if Kraatz had, up to 
that point, failed to train the named individuals according to 
Honda's standards, he still had thirty-three months left on his 
contract to complete the training."21 The Agreement provides 
cause for termination for Kraatz' refusal "to fulfill" his 
management responsibilities. "Fulfill" means "to carry into 
effect, as an intention, to bring to pass, as a design...to 
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realize or manifest completely." Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary, supra. p. 335. Kraatz should not be able to refuse 
to fulfill his responsibilities for the first twenty-seven 
months (4 5% of contract term) and claim immunity from 
termination. 
Could Kraatz have been excused from 27 months of 
nonperformance under a construction contract or a promissory 
note? It is well settled where time of performance is not 
explicitly stated in a contract, performance will be required 
within a "reasonable time." See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998). Failing to perform for 
twenty-seven months of a sixty-month contract is not a 
"reasonable time."22 
POINT IV 
OTHER REASONS JUSTIFYING DISCHARGE 
The Agreement in 5 1.2(c) required Kraatz to use his 
best professional skill to perform services at all times for the 
business and benefit of Heritage. Besides the reasons set forth 
above, Kraatz failed to perform his responsibilities by making 
poor decisions on financing that cost the dealership $114,000 
(see FF E.13; Tr. 2040, 2034.), failed to control inventory, 
21
 The trial court made no such Finding of Fact. Respectfully, 
it is pure speculation that Kraatz would have made the attempt. 
22
 Kraatz introduced no evidence of acceptability to American 
Honda or that he could adequately train designated persons to 
take over all areas of the dealership (i.e., finance & 
insurance, parts, service, accounting, sales, and personnel) in 
thirty-three months. His failure to do so is fatal since he had 
the burden to prove performance under the Agreement. See 
Russell v. Qgden Union R.R. & Depot Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 
1952) . 
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failed to provide customer service and failed to maintain 
company morale. (See FF E. 21; Tr. 2033-34, 2041, 2411.) 
CONCLUSION 
Heritage respectfully requests this Court reconsider its 
Decision issued March 11, 1999, because Kraatz never objected to 
extrinsic evidence, introduced much of it himself, and because 
the case was tried as if the Agreement was ambiguous. The 
extrinsic evidence supported the trial court's Findings which 
are entitled to deference from this Court. Heritage submits, 
for all the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's decision 
concerning termination should be affirmed and the issues raised 
on cross-appeal considered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of April, 
1999. 
Donald J. Winder, Esq, 
Gerry B. Holman, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees and Cross-
Appellants 
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